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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. H., by and through 
his Guardian ad Litem, D. H. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WEST VALLEY CITY, WEST ] 
VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, ] 
and JENE V. LYDAY, individually ; 
Defendants-Respondent. 
i Case No. 900052 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Rules of Appellate Procedure prohibit the injection 
of new issues in the Reply Brief of the Appellant, and limit 
discussion in the Reply Brief tb issues raised and discussed in 
Appelleefs Brief. The issues raised in Appellee's Brief and which 
will be discussed in this Reply Brief are as follows: 
1. General attempts by Appellee to urge unduly narrow 
interpretations of the law upon this Court. 
2. Whether or not the "deliberate indifference" 
standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the City of 
Canton case applies to the present case. 
3. Whether or not there is a legitimate right of 
privacy protected by the Constitution which extends to sexual 
molestation committed under color of law. 
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4. Whether or not the standard of Respondeat Superior 
discussed by the Utah Supreme Court in Birkner v. Salt Lake County 
is applicable to the facts of this case. 
5. Whether or not West Valley was negligent in that it 
could or should have foreseen the conduct of its employee and/or 
had a duty to test its police employees before hiring them for 
police service. 
POINT I 
APPELLANT URGES UNREASONABLY NARROW INTERPRETATIONS 
OF THE LAW UPON THIS COURT 
A. West Valley's Constructive Knowledge Includes Knowledge of 
Misconduct in Other Police Departments. 
Appellant argues that there was no prior history in West 
Valley City of hiring police officers who were sexually deviant. 
Appellant states: "Indeed, West Valley was in its inception at the 
time it hired Lyday." (Brief of Appellant at page 29.) This being 
the case, West Valley alleges that there has been no proof of a 
policy, procedure or custom of acquiescence in a known pattern of 
unconstitutional behavior, and that Section 1983 liability can 
therefore not attach. 
West Valley would have this Court conclude that each 
individual police department throughout the entire country should 
be considered in a cocoon, like an ostrich with its head in the 
sand, devoid of knowledge of the activities and problems of any 
other police department. In reality, police departments are like 
any other entity. They are required to be observant and keep 
themselves informed of trends and problems in law enforcement 
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nationwide. Thus, West Valley cannot defend its inadequate 
policies in hiring on the basis that it allegedly had no prior 
experience with sexually deviant police officers. West Valley's 
actual constructive knowledge must be extended to include the 
experience of other police departments throughout the country. On 
that basis, there is a very well known history of officers taking 
advantage of their positions of authority to sexually molest and 
abuse innocent victims. 
B. West Valley Did Not Require Actual Knowledge Lyday was 
Sexually Deviant. 
Another example of the unreasonable extremes which West 
Valley urges upon this Court is found on page 30-31 of Appellee's 
Brief, wherein it is stated: "Without West Valley's actual 
knowledge of Lyday's prior deviant, sexual misconduct, if any, or 
some other notice of this employee's propensity (assuming such 
existed at the time) , the need to screen for sexual deviancy could 
not have been 'so obvious1 and the inadequacy 'so likely' to result 
in the violation of J.H.'s constitutional rights that West Valley 
could reasonably be said to have been 'deliberately indifferent', 
to the need". 
In other words, West Valley argues that there is no need 
to test an officer for sexual deviancy unless the city has actual 
knowledge the officer is sexually deviant. Why there would then 
be a need for testing is not explained. If this standard were to 
be adopted by the Court, it would be akin to the Court requiring 
Plaintiff to prove that the city had a deliberate intent to hire 
sexual deviants. This is of course an improper standard, one which 
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neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any other Appellate Court has 
required to be demonstrated before Section 1983 liability may be 
found. 
POINT II 
THE CITY OF CANTON STANDARD OF 
"DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE" APPLIES IN THIS CASE. 
West Valley's Brief repeatedly questions whether or not 
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Canton, Ohio v. 
Harris, 49 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989) has application in the 
present case. West Valley contends that the Canton case involved 
issues regarding the "training" of police officers, rather than 
issues of "hiring" and "supervision". In reality, a careful and 
thoughtful reading of the decision of the Supreme Court in Canton 
reveals that "training" was not the issue, but rather, deficient 
policies in general, whether they be training, screening before 
hiring, supervising, etc. Quoting again from the pertinent holding 
in Canton, the Supreme Court stated as follows: 
We hold today that the inadequacy of police 
training may serve as the basis for Section 
1983 liability only where the failure to train 
amounts to deliberate indifference to the 
rights of persons with whom the police come 
into contact. This rule is most consistent 
with our admonition in Monell . . . that a 
municipality can be liable under section 1983 
only where its policies are the "moving force 
[behind] the constitutional violation." Only 
where a municipality's failure to train its 
employees in a relevant respect evidences a 
"deliberate indifference" to the rights of its 
inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly 
thought of as a city "policy or custom" that 
is actionable under Section 1983. 
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"Municipal liability under Section 1983 
attaches where - and only where - a deliberate 
choice to follow a course of action is made 
from among various alternatives" by city policy 
makers. . . . only where a failure to train 
reflects a "deliberate" or "conscious" choice 
by a municipality - a policy as defined by our 
prior cases - can a city be liable for such a 
failure under Section 1983. 
. the issue in a case like this one, 
however, is whether that training program is 
adequate; and if it is not, the question 
becomes whether such inadequate training can 
justifiably said to represent "city policy." 
It may seem contrary to common sense to assert 
that a municipality will actually have a policy 
of not taking reasonable steps to train its 
employees. But it may happen that in light of 
the duties assigned to specific officers or 
employees the need for more or different 
training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so 
likely to result in the violation of 
constitutional rights, that the policy makers 
of the city can reasonably be said to have been 
deliberately indifferent to the need. In that 
event, the failure to provide proper training 
may fairly be said to represent a policy for 
which the city is responsible, and for which 
the city may be held liable if it actually 
causes injury. (£d. at 1204-1205, emphasis 
added•) 
In its holding, the Court used the term "policy" or some 
form thereof no less than eight times. It is clear therefore that 
the Court did not intend to limit the "deliberate indifference" 
standard to only those narrow situations where training of police 
officers is involved, but rather intended that the standard would 
extend to any "policy" of the city which leads to unconstitutional 
acts by its police officers. 
Common sense dictates that those same concerns which 
motivate city policy makers in regards to the training of its 
police officers, should also motivate those policy makers in 
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regards to hiring and supervision of those same police officers. 
Proper practices in hiring, training and supervising police 
officers all work together to insure that the officers fulfill 
their duties appropriately, and without intrusion on the 
constitutional rights of citizens. They are inseparable parts of 
an entire program. Therefore, if West Valley can be said to have 
been "deliberately indifferent" to the interests and concerns of 
its citizens when it failed to properly screen and supervise 
Officer Lyday, and such deliberate indifference resulted in an 
unconstitutional deprivation, the city should be liable. 
POINT III 
WEST VALLEY IGNORES PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM TO A VIOLATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
West Valley acknowledges the existence of a 
constitutional right of privacy, although claiming that no 
constitutional right of privacy of the "specific nature" alleged 
has ever been found. There is virtually no response or discussion 
regarding the many citations of authority in Appellantfs Brief 
discussing the right of privacy which has been found to exist by 
both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Rather than seriously discuss the privacy issue raised 
in Plaintiff's Complaint and Appeal Brief, West Valley discusses 
in some detail the 14th Amendment and cases arising therefrom which 
conclude that there is no violation of liberty without due process 
of law if a post-deprivation remedy is provided. This is the same 
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tactic used by West Valley in its Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
which the District Court approved. However, Plaintiff has not 
relied upon the 14th Amendment, and citation to case law arising 
therefrom is totally irrelevant and inappropriate. West Valley 
must not be allowed to divert the Court's attention to focus on the 
14th Amendment, when Plaintiff's claimed constitutional deprivation 
was based on the well accepted right of privacy found in the 
constitution. 
Even when briefly discussing the privacy claims raised 
by Plaintiff, West Valley attempts to phrase the issues in terms 
of common assault. They allege that if Plaintiff's claim is upheld 
"any assault" that causes personal injury to ones body or mind 
could be characterized as a "privacy" violation. This is not 
correct. It is clear that a sexual intrusion of the nature alleged 
by Plaintiff is different from assault. It is also clear that 
sexual molestation calls into issue matters of "privacy" which 
assault does not. Indeed, body parts necessarily involved in 
sexual molestation are commonly referred to as "private parts". 
(Websters New World Dictionary, 2nd College Edition, 1986, 
definition of "private".) There is thus a very distinct difference 
between one who assaults another by punching him in the nose, and 
one who fondles the "private parts" of an unwilling victim. 
West Valley's assertion that there has never been 
recognized a constitutionally protected privacy right involving 
sexual offenses by police officers is also incorrect. In York v. 
Storv, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963), Cert. Den. 376 U.S. 939, 
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11 L.Ed. 2d 659, 84 S. Ct. 794, a female plaintiff came to a police 
station to complain of an assault. The officer with whom she 
consulted insisted that the complainant be photographed in various 
nude and indecent positions. She objected to undressing and 
maintained that her bruises would not show on any of the 
photographs. The officer nevertheless proceeded to take the 
pictures without calling a policewoman who was present at the 
station. The officer thereafter printed and circulated those 
pictures among police personnel. It was held by the 9th Circuit 
that the police officer's actions constituted such an arbitrary 
intrusion upon the Plaintiff's privacy as to make him liable in an 
action under the Federal Civil Rights Act. Also, in Martin v. 
Covington, 541 F. Supp. 803 (E.D.Ky. 1982), a police department was 
held liable under the Federal Civil Rights Act for violation of a 
privacy right when it forced the Plaintiff to solicit homosexual 
acts, although such acts were never actually engaged in. 
POINT IV 
THE STANDARD FOR RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR CLAIMS 
ESTABLISHED IN BIRKNER V. SALT LAKE COUNTY IS INAPPROPRIATE 
IN THE PARTICULAR FACTS OF THIS CASE 
A. Plaintiff Believed that Lyday's Acts Were Authorized and 
Furthered the Interests of the Employer. 
West Valley claims that Plaintiff's Respondeat Superior 
claim must be denied. West Valley relies on the case of Birkner 
v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), wherein the Court 
held that Salt Lake County was not liable under the doctrine of 
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Respondeat Superior for the actions of a social worker employed by 
the County. The social worker had engaged in sexual relations with 
a client, for which the client later sued. The Court held that 
Salt Lake County could not be held liable for the actions of its 
employee, citing as its main reason the fact that both the social 
worker and the client knew that the sexual contact was not related 
to the legitimate interests of the employer. The Court stated: 
"Neither Flowers (the social worker) nor Birkner (the client) 
thought their sexual conduct was part of the therapy - - the 
service that Flowers was hired to provide." (Id. at 1058, Emphasis 
added.) 
The present case is very different. J.H. did believe the 
physical contacts initiated by Lyday were related to the interests 
of the employer. Lyday specifically informed J.H. before 
initiating the contact that he (Lyday) was going to teach J.H. 
"standard relaxation techniques" used by police officers. J.H. had 
joined the Explorer Post because he was interested in police work 
as a career, and because he knew that the Post had been established 
to train and guide young people interested in pursuing law 
enforcement careers. (R. at 184 [Affidavit of David C. Campbell, 
Para. 14.] R. at 210 [Affidavit of Jason Hepler, Para. 3-9.]) 
Plaintiff therefore submitted to the physical contact initiated by 
Lyday in the reasonable belief that Lyday was furthering the 
interests of his employer. This case is therefore very 
distinguishable from Birkner. 
B. An Employer Should be Liable When the Employee's Wrongful Acts 
are Apparently Authorized. 
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Accepting for the purposes of tliis argument that Lyday 
knew that his actions were not calculated fc« -further the interests 
of his employer, it is nevertheless appropriate that the doctrine 
of Respondeat Superior apply when the master creates a situation 
whereby an employee is able to deliberately injure an unsuspecting 
victim. If the master creates circumstances leading the victim to 
believe that the acts of the employee are appropriate, the master 
should be liable for the employee's acts. These principles are 
very clearly endorsed in the Restatement of Agency, 2d, Sections 
261-266. Most clearly on point in this ca$e are Sections 266 and 
262 which provide as follows: 
Section 266. Physical Harm Caused by Reliance 
Upon Representations. 
A purported master or other principle is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused 
to others . . . by their reasonable reliance 
upon the tortious representations of one acting 
within his apparent authority or apparent scope 
of employment. 
Section 262. Agent Acts for His Own Purposes. 
A person who otherwise would be liable to 
another for the misrepresentations of one 
apparently acting for him is not released from 
liability by the fact that the servant or other 
agent acts entirely for his own purposes, 
unless the other has notice of this. 
The above rules serve not only to protect innocent 
victims such as Plaintiff in this case, but also, in the final 
analysis, are beneficial to the employer. It is in the interest 
of employers that the statements and representations of their 
employees be respected and relied upon by customers and others who 
deal with the employee. The employer would not be served by a rule 
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of law which encourages customers to be questioning and suspicious 
of every statement and representation of the company's employees. 
This factor is especially important in regard to police 
departments. A police department would be greatly hampered in 
fulfilling its duties if citizens questioned and challenged every 
order and direction of the cityfs police officers. Citizens will 
be encouraged to abide by the directions of police officers if they 
have assurance those directions are backed by the police 
department, even if it is later determined that the officer was 
acting for his own purposes. 
C. Higher Respondeat Superior Standards Should Apply to-Police 
Departments. 
There is, of course, one other distinguishing feature 
between Birkner and the present case. The employee in the present 
case was a police officer, whereas the employee in the Birkner case 
was a social worker. There are certainly major differences between 
police officers and social workers. Police officers are 
unquestionably the most conspicuous, respected, and authoritative 
employees of a municipality. Police officers wear distinctive 
uniforms and drive conspicuous automobiles. They are given guns 
and other badges of authority. They have the authority to stop any 
person at any time for any reason, or for no reason at all. A 
person thus detained may very reasonably believe that the officer 
is serving the needs of the master. Given such unique authorities 
and powers granted police officers, this Court should impose a 
strict Respondeat Superior standard upon the city for the actions 
of its police officers. The standards which should apply are those 
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enunciated in the cases of White v. County of Orange. 166 Cal. App. 
3rd 566, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1985); Applewhite v. City of Baton 
Rouge, 380 So, 119 (La. App. 1979); and Turner v. State. 494 So. 
2d 1292 (La. App. 1986), which were cited in Appellant's Brief. 
POINT V 
NEGLIGENCE ISSUES 
West Valley asserts three reasons as to why it cannot be 
found liable under a negligence theory: 
(1) There is allegedly no evidence that West Valley 
could or should have known of Lyday's sexual deviancies; 
(2) There is no duty to test police employees for 
sexual deviancy; and, 
(3) The actions of Lyday were completely 
unforeseeable. 
A. Evidence that West Valley Could Have Known of Lyday's Sexual 
Deviancies. 
West Valley omits certain important facts contained in 
the record when it states that there is no evidence that it could 
have known about Lydayfs sexual deviancy. The Affidavit of Arthur 
Brown stated very clearly that testing was available and could have 
been employed by West Valley at the time Lyday was hired, and that 
had such testing been employed it would more than likely have 
detected the sexually deviant attitudes and character of Lyday, 
thus enabling West Valley to avoid the mistake of hiring Lyday. 
[R. at 217-219] Indeed, this testing could have been carried out 
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at any time during Lydayfs employment, and would certainly have 
been appropriate again at the time when the city first contemplated 
placing Lyday in a delicate position of trust and authority over 
vulnerable young people. 
B. The Duty to Conduct Psychological Testing 
There clearly is a duty on the part of police departments 
in the State of Utah to conduct psychological testing of police 
employees, or at least to insure that such psychological testing 
has been performed by some other agency, before the department 
hires a police officer. 
Utah Code Ann* Section 67-16-6 (1)(h) provides that an 
applicant for a police department: "Shall be free of any physical, 
emotional, or mental condition that might affect adversely the 
performance of duty as a peach officer, as determined through a 
selection process by the employing agency." (Emphasis added.) The 
"selection process" envisioned by this section clearly requires 
something more than and different from the "background check" West 
Valley claims to have conducted on Lyday before he was hired. The 
background check conducted by West Valley is discussed in Section 
67-16-6(1) (g) which provides that the applicant "shall demonstrate 
good moral character, as determined by a background investigation." 
(Emphasis added.) Acknowledging for the purposes of this argument 
that a background check was indeed conducted by West Valley, the 
question remains as to what "selection process" West Valley 
employed to insure that Lyday was "free of any . . . emotional or 
mental conditions that might affect adversely the performance of 
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duty as a peace officer . . ." West Valley was under a statutory 
obligation to conduct psychological testing, and failed to fulfill 
that duty. 
C. The Actions of West Valley's Employee Were Foreseeable 
West Valley contends that Lyday's actions were not 
foreseeable, and only with the benefit of hindsight is it apparent 
that it might have been wise to be more careful in hiring and 
supervising Lyday. In fact, Lyday's actions were not only 
foreseeable, but were almost inevitable given the totally deficient 
practices of West Valley. 
Sexual offenses against unsuspecting and innocent 
citizens by police officers occur regularly throughout this 
country. Indeed, the headlines of local newspapers have recently 
been filled on several occasions with escapades of local law 
enforcement officials who have sexually molested or harassed 
others. West Valley cannot therefore be heard to say that such 
problems are unforeseeable. Despite knowledge of such abuses, West 
Valley hired Lyday without any attempt to certify his psychological 
fitness. This negligence was then compounded when Lyday was placed 
in a sensitive position of trust and authority over young people. 
Again, no attempt was made to certify his fitness for such 
position. West Valley's irresponsibility continued as Lyday was 
allowed to function in this position without training, and with 
absolutely no supervision. To grant anyone such unbridled 
authority over young people is totally unacceptable. Under such 
circumstances, abuses such as occur*-^ -in +-his case were 
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inevitable, if not from Lyday, then firom some future similarly 
situated employee. 
CONCLUSION 
Substantial factual issues remain to be resolved in 
regard to each cause of action enumerated in Plaintiff's complaint 
against West Valley City and the West Valley City Police 
Department. The District Court Summary Judgment should therefore 
be reversed, and further proceedings conducted to resolve all 
issues of fact. 
DATED this Z2L day of Or ^ ) l^r 1990. 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & 
BOUD, P.C. 
Richard I. Ashton 
Wayne H. Braunberger 
David A. Wilde 
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